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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 22/07/2011

Accident number: 790

Accident time: 11:55

Accident Date: 06/12/2007

Where it occurred: AF/0112/00168, MF
0231, Shinwari Village,
Sorobi District, Kabul
Province
Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Country: Afghanistan

Secondary cause: Victim inattention (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: (37)

Date of main report: None
Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded)

Ground condition: metal fragments
rocks/stones
steep slope
Date last modified: 22/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate area marking (?)
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
victim squatting and stepped on mine (?)
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Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more
information becomes available.
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF DEMINING ACCIDENT involving [Demining group]
DT# 01 ON 06 DECEMBER 2007
INTRODUCTION:
A Board of Inquiry (BOI) was convened by Program Director of UNMACA to investigate the
fatal demining accident involving [the Victim] a deminer from [Demining group] DT # 01. The
accident occurred at 11:55 hours on 06 December 2007 at task # AF/0112/00168/MF 0231
located in Shinwari Village, Sorobi District of Kabul Province.
SUMMARY:
The area was mined in 1997 by the Russians whose convoys were being attacked by
Mujahideen as they travelled through Sorobi Pass. The clearance task is confirmed by LIAT
as a High mine impacted area. A total of 21 mine accidents have been recorded in this area
of which 4 accidents have occurred during the current year.
The deminer was working on a steep, sloping area of a mountain that was known to contain
anti-personnel mines. The clearance was made difficult due to the gradient of the slope
(approx 45 degrees), the loose nature of the rock and the number of metal fragments in the
area.
After the routine break at 1140 – 1150 hrs, the deminer was advised by his Section Leader
(SL) to mark his lane clearly so that the SL could conduct his own QC checks. Just prior to
the detonation the deminer was observed by the SL and another deminer to be preparing
paint for the painting of rocks (for the next week). At 1155 the deminer stepped onto an antipersonnel mine with his left foot while in the squatting position. The deminer then rolled down
the steep slope to his final resting place in a previously cleared area. On the way down the
slope the deminer lost his helmet and woollen hat and sustained some facial injuries.
The team reacted as per SOPs and the CASEVAC procedure was performed, treatment was
given and the victim was then moved to the ambulance and transported to the hospital in
Kabul. Unfortunately in spite of extensive surgery and treatment the deminer died at the
hospital the following day at 8:00 am.
Some of the stones used for marking the clearance lane had migrated down the slope from
the accident site during the blast and were visible to the BOI during their inspection.
CONCLUSIONS:
It is the BOI conclusion that the deminer had missed a mine during the morning’s clearance.
He was not clearly marking his lane progressively throughout the course of the day and he
inadvertently stepped on this mine, receiving extensive blast injuries that resulted in his death.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
The following points are to be considered by all clearance organisations in the MAPA:
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•

A more rigorous permanent marking system should be employed in clearance
operations that are located on steep sloping ground where there is a danger that the
marking could move i.e. steel pegs/stakes and ropes should be used not rocks.

•

Full PPE shall be worn correctly at all times in a hazard area.

•

All organisations are reminded that they shall inform UNMACA when making any
variations to the organisations SOPs. This is so that an assessment can be made of
the proposed changes before permission is granted to change SOPs.

•

The team leader and section leader should both be given formal warnings for not
ensuring their team members were adhering to SOPs by clearly marking the lane as
they progressed into the hazard.

Victim Report
Victim number: 980

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: DECEASED

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: severe Face
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Leg Below knee
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. ". . . extensive blast injuries that resulted
in his death . . . the deminer died at the hospital the following day at 8:00 am".

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the Victim
was working improperly having missed a mine and failed to mark his working area
appropriately and the errors were not corrected in a timely manner. It also seems likely that
the Victim was working without wearing a visor because the investigators’ recommendations
include “Full PPE shall be worn correctly at all times in a hazard area”. The secondary cause
is listed as Victim inattention because the Victim stepped on a mine he had failed to locate
during his work (unless the marking was so inadequate that he was actually outside the area
he had cleared without knowing that he was).
The Victim stepped on a mine while squatting and may have suffered severe thigh, buttock or
groin injury as well because the point of initiation would have been behind his blast armour. If
he did, it is likely that the facial injuries were caused by the subsequent fall down the hillside
rather than the blast.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years,
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have
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been more responsible over sharing data than those internationals who presume greater
responsibility.
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